Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22920
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 14/2005
Publisher: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Abstract: 
Individuals who compete in a contest-like situation (for example, in sports, in promotion tournaments, or in an appointment contest) may have an incentive to illegally utilize resources in order to improve their relative positions. We analyze such doping within a tournament game between two heterogeneous players. Three major e.ects are identified which determine a player’s doping decision — a cost e.ect, a likelihood e.ect and a windfall-profit e.ect. Moreover, we discuss whether the favorite or the underdog is more likely to be doped, the impact of doping on overall performance, the influence of increased heterogeneity on doping, the welfare implications of doping, and possible prevention of doping.
Subjects: 
contest
doping
drugs
fraud in research
tournament
JEL: 
K42
J3
M5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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