Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22916
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dc.contributor.authorGarratt, Roden_US
dc.contributor.authorTröger, Thomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:59Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:59Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22916-
dc.description.abstractIn standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator?a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and makes positive profits. First-price and Dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium, and whether or not the speculator wins the auction and distorts the final allocation depends on the number of bidders, the value distribution, and the discount factor. Speculators do not make profits in first-price or Dutch auctions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2005,10en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordstandard auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordspeculationen_US
dc.subject.keywordresaleen_US
dc.subject.keywordefficiencyen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSpekulationen_US
dc.subject.stwAllokationseffizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSpeculation in Standard Auctions with Resaleen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn490546722en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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