Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22916 
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dc.contributor.authorGarratt, Roden
dc.contributor.authorTröger, Thomasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:59Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:59Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22916-
dc.description.abstractIn standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator - a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and makes positive profits. First-price and Dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium, and whether or not the speculator wins the auction and distorts the final allocation depends on the number of bidders, the value distribution, and the discount factor. Speculators do not make profits in first-price or Dutch auctions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x10/2005en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordstandard auctionsen
dc.subject.keywordspeculationen
dc.subject.keywordresaleen
dc.subject.keywordefficiencyen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwSpekulationen
dc.subject.stwAllokationseffizienzen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSpeculation in Standard Auctions with Resale-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn490546722en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:102005-

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