Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/229125
Authors: 
Goetz, Martin
Laeven, Luc
Levine, Ross
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 2511
Abstract: 
We evaluate the role of insider ownership in shaping banks' equity issuances in response to the global financial crisis. We construct a unique dataset on the ownership structure of U.S. banks and their equity issuances and discover that greater insider ownership leads to less equity issuances. Several tests are consistent with the view that bank insiders are reluctant to reduce their private benefits of control by diluting their ownership through equity issuances. Given the connection between bank equity and lending, the results stress that ownership structure can shape the resilience of banks-and hence the entire economy-to aggregate shocks.
Subjects: 
Ownership Structure
Equity Issuances
Banking
Financial Crisis
Regulation
JEL: 
G32
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-4511-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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