Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22905
Authors: 
Herreiner, Dorothea K.
Puppe, Clemens
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2004,28
Abstract: 
In the recent experimental literature several social preference models have been suggested that address observed behavior not reducible to the pursuit of selfinterest. Inequality aversion is one such model where preferences are distributional. Frequently, envy is suggested as the underlying rationale for inequality aversion. Envy is a central criterion in the theoretical literature on fair division, whose definition (Foley 1967) differs from the more casual use of the word in the experimental literature. We present and discuss results from free-form bargaining experiments on fair division problems where the role of envy in Foley?s sense can be analyzed and compared to social preferences. We find that envy freeness does matter as a secondary criterion.
Subjects: 
Fairness
Envy Freeness
Social Preferences
Bargaining
JEL: 
D63
C91
C78
A13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.