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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22898
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Jost, Peter-Jürgen | en |
dc.contributor.author | Kräkel, Matthias | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-29T15:10:49Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-29T15:10:49Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22898 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents’ strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous agents, there may be either a first-mover or a second-mover advantage. Under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. The principal is able to prevent preemptive behavior in equilibrium, but he will not implement first-best efforts although the agents are risk neutral. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x21/2004 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M5 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M12 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J3 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | preemption | en |
dc.subject.keyword | tournaments | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wettbewerb | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Tournament | en |
dc.title | Preemptive Behavior in Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 473006049 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:bonedp:212004 | - |
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