Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22898
Authors: 
Jost, Peter-Jürgen
Kräkel, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2004,21
Abstract: 
Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequential. We show that agents? strategic behavior in sequential-move tournaments significantly differ from the one in simultaneous-move tournaments: In a sequential-move tournament with heterogeneous agents, there may be either a first-mover or a second-mover advantage. Under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. The principal is able to prevent preemptive behavior in equilibrium, but he will not implement first-best efforts although the agents are risk neutral.
Subjects: 
preemption
tournaments
JEL: 
M5
M12
J3
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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