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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 13/2004
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of teams is equivalent to the behavior of individuals in Cournot competition. Nevertheless, there are models of team-organization such that teams and individuals are behaviorally equivalent providing a theoretical foundation for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition. We show that this assumption is robust in experiments in contrast to analog experimental results on price-competition in the literature.
Schlagwörter: 
unitary player assumption
experiments
group behavior
theory of the firm
JEL: 
D21
C92
D43
D23
M52
C91
C72
L22
L13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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