Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22890
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dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen_US
dc.contributor.authorIrlenbusch, Bernden_US
dc.contributor.authorHarbring, Christineen_US
dc.contributor.authorSelten, Reinharden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:44Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:44Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22890-
dc.description.abstractIn a contest players compete for winning a prize by exerting effort and thereby increasingtheir probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relativeposition by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests withheterogeneous and homogeneous agents who may individually sabotage each other. Ourresults suggest that sabotaging behavior systematically varies with the composition ofdifferent types of agents in a contest. Moreover, if the saboteur?s identity is revealed sabotagedecreases while retaliation motives prevail.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2004,12en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordContesten_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordSabotageen_US
dc.subject.keywordTournamenten_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwExperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTournamenten_US
dc.titleSabotage in Asymmetric Contests An Experimental Analysisen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn392675595en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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