Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/228905
Authors: 
Beccuti, Juan
Möller, Marc
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers No. 20-17
Abstract: 
This paper proposes a tractable model of a dynamic contest where players have private information about the contest's prize. We show that private information helps to encourage players who have fallen behind, leading to an increase in aggregate incentives. We derive the optimal information design for a designer interested in the maximization of aggregate effort. Optimal signals turn out to be private and imperfectly informative and aim to level the playing field at any stage of the dynamic interaction.
Subjects: 
Dynamic contests
discouragement effect
information design
JEL: 
C72
D72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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