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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 20-14
Verlag: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Zusammenfassung: 
I consider an environment in which the entrepreneur generates information about the quality of the projects prior to contracting with the investor. The investor faces a moral hazard problem, since the entrepreneur may divert the funding for private consumption. When the investor bargains with the entrepreneur, I find that the efficient amount of information is generated if and only if the bargaining power of the entrepreneur is high enough. I interpret this result in terms of investors' concentration, competitiveness, and generosity measures. I show that the investor prefers a non-absolute bargaining power when the project costs are high enough.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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