Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/228890 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 20-02
Verlag: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Zusammenfassung: 
To encourage private actions for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from the fine. We analyze the effectiveness of this policy. Such a rebate does not encourage settlement negotiations that would otherwise not occur. If, however, the parties settle without the rebate, the introduction of the reduction increases the settlement amount, yet at the price of reduced deterrence for those wrongdoers who are actually fined. Under a leniency program the rebate has no effect on the leniency applicant: she doesn't pay a fine that can be reduced. The overall effect of a fine reduction on deterrence is, therefore, negative.
Schlagwörter: 
antitrust
damages
deterrence
leniency
JEL: 
D43
K21
K42
L40
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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