Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22888
Authors: 
Morgenstern, Albrecht
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2004,10
Abstract: 
Veto institutions are often dominated by government opponents with rival electoral and policy interests (e.g. "divided government"). I investigate the tradeoff between policy control and policy blockade when both the government and the veto party may cater to opposing special interests. The value of an opposition veto depends on whether electoral accountability can discipline bad type politicians. When this is not the case, a veto is beneficial only if the governments special interests are expected to be harmful. In contrast, when bad types care about (re-)election, a veto always increases expected welfare, providing a new rationale for the frequent occurrence of "divided government". Without policy rivalry, an opposition veto fares even better.
Subjects: 
Political Accountability
Opposition
Veto
Divided Government
JEL: 
D72
A12
H11
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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