Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22881
Authors: 
Tasnádi, Attila
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2003,14
Abstract: 
We investigate a duopsonistic wage-setting game in which the firms have a limited number of workplaces. We assume that the firms have heterogeneous productivity, that there are two types of workers with different reservation wages and that a worker's productivity is independent of his type. We show that equilibrium unemployment arises in the wage-setting game under certain conditions, although the efficient allocation of workers would result in full employment.
Subjects: 
Unemployment
Bertrand-Edgeworth
wage-setting games
JEL: 
J41
E24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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