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dc.contributor.authorSchweizer, Ursen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:38Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:38Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22879-
dc.description.abstractWhile various liability rules of tort law provide efficient incentives to invest, breach remedies of contract law are claimed to be distortive. Since, at least in Germany, obligations law provides general rules for both contractual and tort relationships such discrepancy seems puzzling. The paper identifies a saddle point property as the driving force behind most efficiency results and it establishes that fault rules of a general type generate this property. The model is then confronted with important legal rules of the German law of obligations. The alleged inefficiency of expectation damages turns out to rest, not on a failure of breach remedies, but on the binary nature of delivery choice as imposed by the traditional analysis of contract law.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x2/2004en
dc.subject.jelK12en
dc.subject.jelK13en
dc.subject.jelD62en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwSchuldrechten
dc.subject.stwVertragsrechten
dc.subject.stwHaftungen
dc.subject.stwRechtsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleLaw and Economics of Obligations-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn384654045en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:22004-

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