Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22879
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dc.contributor.authorSchweizer, Ursen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:38Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:38Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22879-
dc.description.abstractWhile various liability rules of tort law provide efficient incentivesto invest, breach remedies of contract law are claimed to be distortive.Since, at least in Germany, obligations law provides general rules forboth contractual and tort relationships such discrepancy seems puzzling.The paper identifies a saddle point property as the driving forcebehind most efficiency results and it establishes that fault rules of ageneral type generate this property. The model is then confrontedwith important legal rules of the German law of obligations. The allegedinefficiency of expectation damages turns out to rest, not on afailure of breach remedies, but on the binary nature of delivery choiceas imposed by the traditional analysis of contract law.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2004,2en_US
dc.subject.jelK12en_US
dc.subject.jelK13en_US
dc.subject.jelD62en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwSchuldrechten_US
dc.subject.stwVertragsrechten_US
dc.subject.stwHaftungen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleLaw and Economics of Obligationsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn384654045en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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