Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22871
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dc.contributor.authorEichberger, Jürgenen_US
dc.contributor.authorKelsey, David H.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSchipper, Burkhard C.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:34Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:34Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22871-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the impact of ambiguity on economic behaviour. We present a relativelynon-technical account of ambiguity and show how it may be applied in economics.Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled.We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium pricesunder Cournot (Bertrand) competition. We also examine the effects of ambiguity onpeace processes. It is shown that ambiguity can act to select equilibria in coordinationgames with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived forthe impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2003,23en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD62en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAmbiguityen_US
dc.subject.keywordOptimismen_US
dc.subject.keywordOligopolyen_US
dc.subject.keywordPeace processesen_US
dc.subject.keywordChoquet expected utilityen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Beziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwErwartungsnutzenen_US
dc.subject.stwOligopolen_US
dc.subject.stwFriedenssicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleAmbiguity and Social Interactionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn384647294en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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