Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22869
Authors: 
Apesteguia, José
Huck, Steffen
Oechssler, Jörg
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2003,2
Abstract: 
We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation models and subject the models to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules. It is more important whom one imitates rather than how. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find that the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between treatments well. The data also provide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of choice and in terms of perception. But imitation is not unconditional. Rather individuals` propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences.
Subjects: 
Evolutionary game theory
Stochastic stability
Imitation
Cournot markets
Experiments
JEL: 
C72
C91
D43
L13
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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