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Barbie, Martin
Puppe, Clemens
Tasnádi, Attila
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2003,13
We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Arrow?s ?independence of irrelevant alternatives? condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (?Condorcet cycles?). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable on a broader class of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is nonmanipulable for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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