Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/228631 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
IMFS Working Paper Series No. 147
Publisher: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS), Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
Central banks sometimes evaluate their own policies. To assess the inherent conflict of interest, we compare the research findings of central bank researchers and academic economists regarding the macroeconomic effects of quantitative easing (QE). We find that central bank papers report larger effects of QE on output and inflation. Central bankers are also more likely to report significant effects of QE on output and to use more positive language in the abstract. Central bankers who report larger QE effects on output experience more favorable career outcomes. A survey of central banks reveals substantial involvement of bank management in research production.
JEL: 
A11
E52
E58
G28
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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