Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22863
Authors: 
Barbie, Martin
Puppe, Clemens
Tasnádi, Attila
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 13/2003
Abstract: 
We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Arrow's ``independence of irrelevant alternatives" condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (``Condorcet cycles"). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable on a broader class of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is non-manipulable for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains.
Subjects: 
Borda count
scoring methods
non-manipulability
JEL: 
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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