Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22862
Authors: 
Sliwka, Dirk
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2003,12
Abstract: 
By enriching a principal-agent model it is shown that the introduction of monetary incentives may reduce an agent?s motivation. In a first step, we allow for the possibility that some agents stick to unverifiable agreements. The larger the fraction of reliable agents, the lower powered will then be the optimal incentive scheme and fixed wages become optimal when performance measurement is costly. If social norms matter such that some agents? reliability is influenced by their beliefs on the convictions of others, high powered incentives signal that not sticking to agreements is a widespread behavior and may lead to lower effort levels.
Subjects: 
Incentives
Intrinsic Motivation
Motivation Crowding-Out
Honesty
JEL: 
D23
J33
M52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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