Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22860
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dc.contributor.authorNautz, Dieteren_US
dc.contributor.authorOechssler, Jörgen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:27Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:27Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22860-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates various theories explaining banks' overbid-ding in the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (ECB).Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we showthat none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbid-ding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the ECB, aimed atneutralizing interest rate expectations, would not eliminate overbid-ding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2003,1en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelE32en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordOverbiddingen_US
dc.subject.keywordrepo auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmonetary policy instruments of the European Central Banken_US
dc.subject.stwPensionsgeschäften_US
dc.subject.stwZinsen_US
dc.subject.stwBanken_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunionen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.subject.stwZinstenderen_US
dc.titleOverbidding in fixed rate tenders - an empirical assessment of alternative explanationsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn382887840en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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