Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22860 
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dc.contributor.authorNautz, Dieteren
dc.contributor.authorOechssler, Jörgen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:27Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:27Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22860-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates various theories explaining banks' overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbidding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the ECB, aimed at neutralizing interest rate expectations, would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x10/2003en
dc.subject.jelE52en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordOverbiddingen
dc.subject.keywordrepo auctionsen
dc.subject.keywordmonetary policy instruments of the European Central Banken
dc.subject.stwPensionsgeschäften
dc.subject.stwZinsen
dc.subject.stwBanken
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwEuropäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunionen
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen
dc.subject.stwZinstenderen
dc.titleOverbidding in Fixed Rate Tenders - An Empirical Assessment of Alternative Explanations-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn382887840en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:102003-

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