Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22848 
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dc.contributor.authorBös, Dieteren
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:20Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:20Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22848-
dc.description.abstractThis paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and shows in which way exogenously fixed bureaucratic incomes induce the same or different lobbying behavior as incentive incomes.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x27/2002en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBureaucracyen
dc.subject.keywordLobbyingen
dc.subject.keywordContestsen
dc.subject.stwBürokratietheorieen
dc.subject.stwBudgetkreislaufen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwBesoldungen
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleContests Among Bureaucrats-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn37445132Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:272002-

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