Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22848
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dc.contributor.authorBös, Dieteren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:20Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:20Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22848-
dc.description.abstractThis paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and shows in which way exogenously fixed bureaucratic incomes induce the same or different lobbying behavior as incentive incomes.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2002,27en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBureaucracyen_US
dc.subject.keywordLobbyingen_US
dc.subject.keywordContestsen_US
dc.subject.stwBürokratietheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwBudgetkreislaufen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwBesoldungen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleContests Among Bureaucratsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn37445132Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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