Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22848
Authors: 
Bös, Dieter
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2002,27
Abstract: 
This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and shows in which way exogenously fixed bureaucratic incomes induce the same or different lobbying behavior as incentive incomes.
Subjects: 
Bureaucracy
Lobbying
Contests
JEL: 
D73
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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