Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22842 
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dc.contributor.authorTisljar, Rolfen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:17Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:17Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22842-
dc.description.abstractWe present a common value mechanism design model for an informed principal where only the principal has private information, but her one-dimensional private information is allowed to be distributed according to any probability measure. For this model we characterize the set of pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria. Furthermore, we present several equilibrium refinements based on the concept of equilibrium domination to take account of beliefs off the equilibrium path. Finally, we demonstrate that the extension of the strong solution of Myerson (Econometrica, 1983) to our model is supported as an equilibrium satisfying all refinement criteria presented (in case a strong solution exists).en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x21/2002en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordequilibrium refinementen
dc.subject.keywordinfinite signaling gameen
dc.subject.keywordinformed principalen
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen
dc.subject.keywordperfect Bayesian equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordprinciple of inscrutabilityen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleMechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Pure-Strategy Equilibria for a Common Value Model-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn374136882en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:212002-

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