Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22840 
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dc.contributor.authorSelten, Reinharden
dc.contributor.authorApesteguia, Joséen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:16Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22840-
dc.description.abstractThis paper reports an experiment on a location game, the so-called "Price-Competition on the Circle." There are n symmetric firms equidistantly located on a circle. Consumers are uniformly distributed. Each consumer buys one and only one unit from that firm whose price, including the cost of transportation, is the lowest, provided such a price is below a maximum willingness to pay. Experiments, extended over 200 periods, were run with 3, 4, and 5 participants. Subjects did not receive any information about the relationship between prices and profits, but they received feedback on prices and profits of two neighbors after each period. The evaluation compares predictions derived from imitation equilibrium (Selten and Ostmann 2001) and Cournot equilibrium, as well as symmetric joint-profit maximization. The results qualitatively favor imitation equilibrium, as long as no cooperation is observed.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x19/2002en
dc.subject.jelR32en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordImitationen
dc.subject.keywordCooperationen
dc.subject.keywordLocationen
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsen
dc.subject.stwImitationswettbewerben
dc.subject.stwRäumliche Preistheorieen
dc.subject.stwExperimenten
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleExperimentally Observed Imitation and Cooperation in Price Competition on the Circle-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn374136564en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:192002-

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