Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2284
Authors: 
Boss, Alfred
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 935
Abstract: 
Sickness benefit ineome reduces an employee's opportunity costs of absence from work. In the Federal Republic of Germany the institutional arrangement was changed several times during the 1951-1998 period. This paper investigates the effects on sick leave behavior. According to the empirical analysis, moral hazard is a serious problem in Germany. The paper discusses some institutional changes which would significantly reduce moral hazard.
JEL: 
I18
I38
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
852.89 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.