Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22838
Authors: 
Apesteguia, José
Dufwenberg, Martin
Selten, Reinhard
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2003,9
Abstract: 
Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.
Subjects: 
Anti-trust
leniency
immunity
amnesty
blow the whistle
cartels
pricecompetition
Bertrand model
experiment
communication
JEL: 
L13
D43
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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