Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22837
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dc.contributor.authorRoider, Andreasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:14Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:14Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22837-
dc.description.abstractIn a holdup framework, I provide conditions under which simple delegation of authority isa solution to the complete-contracting problem even though ex-post actions are ex-ante contractible,and unlimited transfer payments are feasible. In particular, delegation turns outto be optimal if the payoff functions of the parties satisfy certain separability and symmetryconditions, and the parties face an underinvestment problem. This result is extended to thecase of potential overinvestment and to multi-dimensional effort provision. Besides providing acomplete-contracting rationale for delegation, the findings contribute to the foundation of incompletecontracts and the property-rights theory of the firm.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2003,8en_US
dc.subject.jelL22en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddelegationen_US
dc.subject.keyworddecentralizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordauthorityen_US
dc.subject.keywordincomplete contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordholdupen_US
dc.subject.keywordproperty rightsen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperative Führungen_US
dc.subject.stwDezentrale Organisationen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechtstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwSunk Costsen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDelegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contracten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn374460566en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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