Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22837 
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dc.contributor.authorRoider, Andreasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:14Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:14Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22837-
dc.description.abstractThe present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts by providing conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from an investment that raises the value of an asset. Delegation turns out to be optimal if (i) the decision-dependent parts of the payoffs of the parties are linear in the asset value, and (ii) decisions have no investment-independent effect. If overinvestment might be an issue, delegation, however, with restricted competencies is optimal if some additional continuity requirements are met.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x8/2003en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddelegationen
dc.subject.keyworddecentralizationen
dc.subject.keywordauthorityen
dc.subject.keywordincomplete contractsen
dc.subject.keywordholdupen
dc.subject.keywordproperty rightsen
dc.subject.stwKooperative Führungen
dc.subject.stwDezentrale Organisationen
dc.subject.stwUnvollständiger Vertragen
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechtstheorieen
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen
dc.subject.stwSunk Costsen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDelegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn374460566en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:82003-

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