Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/228375 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2020-11
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We compare a treatment where the receiver chooses which dimension to verify with one where the sender has this verification control. We find significant differences in outcomes across treatments. However, receivers' payoffs do not differ significantly across treatments, suggesting they are not hurt by delegating verification control. We also show that in both treatments the receiver's best reply to senders' observed behavior is close to the optimal commitment strategy identified by Glazer and Rubinstein.
Schlagwörter: 
communication
partially verifiable messages
verification control
experiment
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.44 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.