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Burdea, Valeria
Montero Muñoz, María
Sefton, Martin
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2020-11
We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We compare a treatment where the receiver chooses which dimension to verify with one where the sender has this verification control. We find significant differences in outcomes across treatments. However, receivers' payoffs do not differ significantly across treatments, suggesting they are not hurt by delegating verification control. We also show that in both treatments the receiver's best reply to senders' observed behavior is close to the optimal commitment strategy identified by Glazer and Rubinstein.
partially verifiable messages
verification control
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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