Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22835
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBös, Dieteren_US
dc.contributor.authorKolmar, Martinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:13Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:13Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22835-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we deal with voluntary and compulsory redistribution in an economy where the enforcement of property rights is costly. Two agents engagein a common-pool contest and two types of potential distortions arise: the waste of resources in the contest and the dilution of incentives to produce as a result of theexistens of externalities in the conflict equilibrium. We were able to show the following results: (i) In some situations Pareto-improving redistribution occursvoluntarily. (ii) Otherwise, the government may choose an indirect way to improve production in the presence of appropriation: In a situation of partial anarchy insome market redistributive policies in other markets may help to reduce the inefficiency in the anarchic market.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2003,2en_US
dc.subject.jelD30en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAnarchyen_US
dc.subject.keywordContestsen_US
dc.subject.keywordRedistributionen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwVerteilungskonflikten_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechtstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwAnarchieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleAggressiveness and Redistributionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn374458871en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
333.62 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.