Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/228359
Authors: 
Alempaki, Despoina
Colman, Andrew M.
Kölle, Felix
Loomes, Graham
Pulford, Briony D.
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2019-13
Abstract: 
In experimental games, a substantial minority of players often fail to best respond. Using two-person 3x3 one-shot games, we investigated whether 'structuring' the pre-decision deliberation process produces greater consistency between individuals' stated values and beliefs on the one hand and their choice of action on the other. Despite this intervention, only just over half of strategy choices constituted best responses. Allowing for risk aversion made little systematic difference. Distinguishing between players according to their other-regarding preferences made a statistically significant difference, but best response rates increased only marginally. It may be that some irreducible minimum level of noise/imprecision generates some proportion of sub-optimal choices. If so, more research might usefully be directed towards competing models of stochastic strategic choice.
Subjects: 
game theory
best response
strategic thinking
social preferences
stated beliefs
JEL: 
A13
C72
C91
C92
D84
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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