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dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:12Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:12Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22834-
dc.description.abstractSplitting leagues or tournaments seems to be puzzling when agents are homogeneous and splitting leads to a negative competition effect. However, it can be shown that the principal can nevertheless benefit from splitting. First, splitting can be used as a divide-and-rule strategy by the principal to create additional incentives when collusion among the agents is possible. Second, splitting leagues gives the principal the opportunity to introduce promotions and relegations between nested tournaments (i.e., tournaments that are intertemporally linked), which also enhances incentives.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x6/2003en
dc.subject.jelM5en
dc.subject.jelJ4en
dc.subject.jelJ3en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen
dc.subject.keywordleaguesen
dc.subject.keywordpromotionen
dc.subject.keywordrelegationen
dc.subject.keywordtournamentsen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwtournamentsen
dc.titleSplitting Leagues-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn374460051en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:62003-

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