Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22834
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dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:12Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:12Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22834-
dc.description.abstractSplitting leagues or tournaments seems to be puzzling when agents arehomogeneous and splitting leads to a negative competition effect. However,it can be shown that the principal can nevertheless benefit from splitting.First, splitting can be used as a divide-and-rule strategy by the principalto create additional incentives when collusion among the agents is possible.Second, splitting leagues gives the principal the opportunity to introducepromotions and relegations between nested tournaments (i.e., tournamentsthat are intertemporally linked), which also enhances incentives.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2003,6en_US
dc.subject.jelM5en_US
dc.subject.jelJ4en_US
dc.subject.jelJ3en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordleaguesen_US
dc.subject.keywordpromotionen_US
dc.subject.keywordrelegationen_US
dc.subject.keywordtournamentsen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwtournamentsen_US
dc.titleSplitting Leaguesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn374460051en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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