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dc.contributor.authorNeugebauer, Tiboren
dc.contributor.authorSelten, Reinharden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:10Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22831-
dc.description.abstractThis article reports the results of a first-price sealed-bid auction experiment, which has been designed to test the Nash equilibrium predictions of individual bidding behavior. Subjects faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed with computerized bids. Three treatments were considered which varied with the conditions of information feedback. In earlier experimental work an overbidding above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium has been frequently reported. Our data provide evidence that this overbidding regularity can be a consequence of the standard information feedback in auction experiments of revealing only the winning bid after each auction. By means of learning direction theory we explain the individual bidding dynamics. Finally we apply impulse balance theory and make long run predictions of the individual bidding behavior.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x3/2003en
dc.subject.jelC12en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC13en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordExperimental economicsen
dc.subject.keywordfirst-price sealed-bid auctionsen
dc.subject.keywordindependent private value modelen
dc.subject.keywordcomputerized competitorsen
dc.subject.keywordbidding theoryen
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwExperimenten
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.titleIndividual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Markets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn374459304en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:32003-

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