Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22831
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNeugebauer, Tiboren_US
dc.contributor.authorSelten, Reinharden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:10Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:10Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22831-
dc.description.abstractThis article reports the results of a first-price sealed-bid auction experiment, which hasbeen designed to test the Nash equilibrium predictions of individual bidding behavior.Subjects faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed withcomputerized bids. Three treatments were considered which varied with the conditionsof information feedback. In earlier experimental work an overbidding above the riskneutral Nash equilibrium has been frequently reported. Our data provide evidence thatthis overbidding regularity can be a consequence of the standard information feedbackin auction experiments of revealing only the winning bid after each auction. By meansof learning direction theory we explain the individual bidding dynamics. Finally weapply impulse balance theory and make long run predictions of the individual biddingbehavior.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2003,3en_US
dc.subject.jelC12en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC13en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimental economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordfirst-price sealed-bid auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordindependent private value modelen_US
dc.subject.keywordcomputerized competitorsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbidding theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwInformationsverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwExperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.titleIndividual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn374459304en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
224.97 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.