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dc.contributor.authorGautier, Axelen
dc.contributor.authorMitra, Manipushpaken
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:07Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:07Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22825-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity. The second property is self-selection for the less efficient firms. The third property is that the mechanism is a third best one. In other words, as long as the budget-constraint is binding, the optimal output is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type. Finally, if the budget constraint is too strong, then we have a full bunching solution.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x15/2002en
dc.subject.jelH42en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordRegulationen
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric Informationen
dc.subject.keywordBudget Constrainten
dc.subject.stwInfrastrukturinvestitionen
dc.subject.stwHaushaltskonsolidierungen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwBudgetrestriktionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleFinancing Infrastructure under Budget Constraint-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn374125813en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:152002-

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