Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22825
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dc.contributor.authorGautier, Axelen_US
dc.contributor.authorMitra, Manipushpaken_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:07Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:07Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22825-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity. The second property is self-selection for the less efficient firms. The third property is that the mechanism is a third best one. In other words, as long as the budget-constraint is binding, the optimal output is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type. Finally, if the budget constraint is too strong, then we have a full bunching solution.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2002,15en_US
dc.subject.jelH42en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRegulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric Informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordBudget Constrainten_US
dc.subject.stwInfrastrukturinvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwHaushaltskonsolidierungen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwBudgetrestriktionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleFinancing Infrastructure under Budget Constrainten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn374125813en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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