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dc.contributor.authorFeess, Eberharden
dc.contributor.authorMuehlheusser, Gerden
dc.contributor.authorWalzl, Markusen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:10:06Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:10:06Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22824-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a standard two-player all-pay auction with private values, where the valuation for the object is private information to each bidder. The crucial feature is that one bidder is favored by the allocation rule in the sense that he need not bid as much as the other bidder to win the auction. Analogously, the other bidder is handicapped by the rule as overbidding the rival may not be enough to win the auction. Clearly, this has important implications on equilibrium behavior. We fully characterize the equilibrium strategies for this auction format and show that there exists a unique pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x14/2002en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAll-pay auctionen
dc.subject.keywordcontesten
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric allocation ruleen
dc.subject.keywordrent-seekingen
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleWhen Bidding More is Not Enough: All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn374125317en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:142002-

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