Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/228245
Authors: 
Dennis, Patrick
Gerardi, Kristopher
Schenone, Carola
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2019-15
Abstract: 
Institutional investors often own significant equity in firms that compete in the same product market. These "common owners" may have an incentive to coordinate the actions of firms that would otherwise be competing rivals, leading to anti-competitive pricing. This paper uses data on airline ticket prices to test whether common owners induce anti-competitive pricing behavior. We find little evidence to support such a hypothesis, and show that the positive relationship between average ticket prices and a commonly used measure of common ownership previously documented in the literature is generated by the endogenous market share component, rather than the ownership component, of the measure.
Subjects: 
common ownership
airline prices
institutional ownership
competition
JEL: 
G33
G34
G38
L41
L11
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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