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dc.contributor.authorPausch, Thiloen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:09:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:09:01Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22794-
dc.description.abstractThe standard situation of ex post information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders is extended by risk aversion and heterogenous levels of reservation utility of lenders. In a situation of direct contracting optimal incentive compatible contracts are valuable for both, borrowers and lenders. However, there may appear credit rationing as a consequence of borrowers optimal decision making. Introducing a bank into the market increases total wealth due to the appearance of a portfolio effect in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. It can be shown that this effect may even reduce the problem of credit rationing provided it is su?ciently strong.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Augsburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre |cAugsburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe |x271en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen
dc.subject.keywordcostly state verificationen
dc.subject.keywordcredit rationingen
dc.subject.keywordbanken
dc.titleCredit Risk, Credit Rationing, and the Role of Banks: The Case of Risk Averse Lenders-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn481666141en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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