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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Pausch, Thilo | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-29T15:09:01Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-29T15:09:01Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22794 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The standard situation of ex post information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders is extended by risk aversion and heterogenous levels of reservation utility of lenders. In a situation of direct contracting optimal incentive compatible contracts are valuable for both, borrowers and lenders. However, there may appear credit rationing as a consequence of borrowers optimal decision making. Introducing a bank into the market increases total wealth due to the appearance of a portfolio effect in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. It can be shown that this effect may even reduce the problem of credit rationing provided it is su?ciently strong. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversität Augsburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre |cAugsburg | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe |x271 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L22 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G21 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | risk aversion | en |
dc.subject.keyword | costly state verification | en |
dc.subject.keyword | credit rationing | en |
dc.subject.keyword | bank | en |
dc.title | Credit Risk, Credit Rationing, and the Role of Banks: The Case of Risk Averse Lenders | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 481666141 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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