Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22794
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dc.contributor.authorPausch, Thiloen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:09:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:09:01Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22794-
dc.description.abstractThe standard situation of ex post information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders is extended by risk aversion and heterogenous levels of reservation utility of lenders. In a situation of direct contracting optimal incentive compatible contracts are valuable for both, borrowers and lenders. However, there may appear credit rationing as a consequence of borrowers optimal decision making. Introducing a bank into the market increases total wealth due to the appearance of a portfolio effect in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. It can be shown that this effect may even reduce the problem of credit rationing provided it is su?ciently strong.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Augsburg |x271en_US
dc.subject.jelL22en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcostly state verificationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcredit rationingen_US
dc.subject.keywordbanken_US
dc.titleCredit Risk, Credit Rationing, and the Role of Banks: The Case of Risk Averse Lendersen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn481666141en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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