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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22793
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Filipova, Lilia | en |
dc.contributor.author | Welzel, Peter | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-29T15:09:01Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-29T15:09:01Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22793 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We examine the effects of ex post revelation of information about the risk type or the risk-reducing behavior of insureds in automobile insurance markets both for perfect competition and for monopoly. Specifically, we assume that insurers can offer a contract with information revelation ex post, i.e., after an accident has occurred, in addition to the usual second-best contracts. Under moral hazard this always leads to a Paretoimprovement of social welfare. For adverse selection we find that this is also true except when bad risks under self-selecting contracts received an information rent, i.e., under monopoly or under competition with cross-subsidization from low to high risks. Regulation can be used to establish Pareto-improvement also in these cases. Privacy concerns do not alter our positive welfare results. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aUniversität Augsburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre |cAugsburg | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe |x270 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G22 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | information moral hazard | en |
dc.subject.keyword | adverse selection | en |
dc.subject.keyword | insurance | en |
dc.title | Reducing Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Cars with Black Boxes | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 481665668 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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