Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/227628 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 20-077
Verlag: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
We employ proprietary data from a large bank to analyze how - in times of crisis - depositors react to a bank nationalization, re-privatization and an accompanying increase in deposit insurance. Nationalization slows depositors fleeing the bank, provided they have sufficient trust in the national government, while the increase in deposit insurance spurs depositors below the new 100K limit to deposit more. Prior to nationalization, depositors bunch just below the then-prevailing 20K limit. But they abandon bunching entirely during state-ownership, to return to bunching below the new 100K limit after re-privatization. Especially depositors with low switching costs are moving money around.
Schlagwörter: 
deposit insurance
coverage limit
bank nationalization
depositor heterogeneity
JEL: 
G21
G28
H13
N23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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