Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/227628
Authors: 
Atmaca, Sümeyra
Kirschenmann, Karolin
Ongena, Steven
Schoors, Koen
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 20-077
Abstract: 
We employ proprietary data from a large bank to analyze how - in times of crisis - depositors react to a bank nationalization, re-privatization and an accompanying increase in deposit insurance. Nationalization slows depositors fleeing the bank, provided they have sufficient trust in the national government, while the increase in deposit insurance spurs depositors below the new 100K limit to deposit more. Prior to nationalization, depositors bunch just below the then-prevailing 20K limit. But they abandon bunching entirely during state-ownership, to return to bunching below the new 100K limit after re-privatization. Especially depositors with low switching costs are moving money around.
Subjects: 
deposit insurance
coverage limit
bank nationalization
depositor heterogeneity
JEL: 
G21
G28
H13
N23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
514.88 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.