Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/227528 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Review of Economic Perspectives [ISSN:] 1804-1663 [Volume:] 19 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] De Gruyter [Place:] Warsaw [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 193-210
Publisher: 
De Gruyter, Warsaw
Abstract: 
The paper deals with the issue of lobbying, defined as a democratic means of promoting interests. The text tries to find answers to the problems in the current economic theory. The basic links are defined by using a simple graphic model, which are further examined by the SWOT analysis. The result is the knowledge that the basic coordination mechanism is the market - the information market. The role of government lies above all in creating a favourable institutional environment that does not interfere with spontaneous market relations. However, there are certain situations that the government could or should regulate. These situations are described by three hypothetical scenarios - a society without lobbying, a society where lobbing exists, but it is not transparent, and a society where lobbing is transparent, leading to a final discussion of possible directions and ways of its regulation.
Subjects: 
Impact of Lobbying on Democracy
Public Choice
New Institutional Economy
New Political Economy
JEL: 
A11
A12
C70
D72
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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