Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/227336 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13809
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
What can employers learn from personality tests when job applicants have incentives to misrepresent themselves? Using a within-subject, laboratory experiment, we compare personality measures with and without incentives for misrepresentation. Incentivized personality measures are weakly to moderately correlated with non-incentivized measures in most treatments but are correlated with intelligence when test-takers have information about desired personalities or are warned that responses may be verified. We document that actual job ads provide information about desired personalities and that employers in the UK who administer personality tests are also likely to administer intelligence tests despite the potential for substitution between the tests.
Schlagwörter: 
personality
measurement
hiring
screening
experiments
JEL: 
C91
D82
M50
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.26 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.