Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22713 
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dc.contributor.authorSülzle, Kaien
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:07:45Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:07:45Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22713-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies imperfect price competition between two intermediaries in an electronic business-to-business matching market with indirect network externalities. The intermediaries differ with regard to their ownership structure: an independent third party incumbent marketplace competes with a challenging collaborative buy-side consortium marketplace in terms of attracting buying and selling firms. When firms can register exclusively with at most one intermediary, the incumbent is only able to deter entry if the number of firms taking ownership in the consortium is sufficiently small. Otherwise, the consortium can successfully enter and monopolize the market. When firms can multihome, i.e. they register simultaneously with both intermediaries, the consortium can always enter while both intermediaries stay in the market with positive profits.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aTechnische Universität Dresden, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften |cDresdenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics |x09/04en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelL11en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordB2B e-commerceen
dc.subject.keywordintermediationen
dc.subject.keywordnetwork externalitiesen
dc.subject.keywordmatchingen
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen
dc.subject.stwE-Businessen
dc.subject.stwDuopolen
dc.subject.stwPreiswettbewerben
dc.subject.stwNetwork Externalitiesen
dc.subject.stwIntermediären
dc.titleDuopolistic Competition between Independent and Collaborative Business-to-Business Marketplaces-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn396475078en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tuddps:0904en

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