Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/226480
Authors: 
Britz, Volker
Gersbach, Hans
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 20/346
Abstract: 
We consider non-cooperative bargaining on the division of a surplus under simple majority rule. We use the "open rule" bargaining protocol as originally suggested by Baron and Ferejohn (1989): Proposals can be amended before they are voted on. It is widely known that there are significant gaps in our understanding of open rule bargaining. In order to address these gaps, we provide a fresh analysis of a particularly simple class of equilibria. Our results shed new light on the efficiency and fairness implications of using an open vs. closed rule in bargaining. In particular, our results on the open rule model suggest that equilibrium delays tend to be longer, and surplus allocations tend to be less egalitarian than originally predicted by Baron and Ferejohn. Understanding the efficiency and fairness properties of different bargaining protocols is crucial for institutional design.
Subjects: 
Bargaining
Legislatures
Open Rules
Baron and Ferejohn
Stationary Equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
C78
D72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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